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Written evidence (UNC0011)
UNCLOS: FIT FOR PURPOSE IN THE 21ST CENTURY?
Introduction
1. We are a former professor of international law at Cardiff and Dundee Universities and 
current Reader at Dundee University. Professor Churchill has been researching and 
writing about the law of the sea for more than 40 years and is the author, with 
Professor Vaughan Lowe QC, of a standard textbook, The Law of the Sea (Manchester 
University Press, 4th edition due April 2022). Dr Jacques Hartmann has likewise been 
researching and writing about the law of the sea and we have both acted as a 
consultant to a number of foreign governments and NGOs. We are making this 
submission because we believe our expertise may be of assistance to the Committee. 
The views expressed below are our own and do not reflect those of any organisation 
with which we are or have been associated. For reasons of space, we only answer the 
Committee’s questions numbered 1 and 3-7. As this submission is in excess of 3,000 
words, we include a summary at the end, as requested by the Committee.
General
2. Initially it should be noted that UNCLOS is largely a ‘framework’ convention, which 
means that it establishes a set of broad commitments for its parties and a general 
system of governance. It contains relatively few detailed or precise obligations, and 
leaves more detailed rules on issues such as shipping, fisheries and protection of the 
marine environment to subsequent agreements, of which there are many (see para 16 
below). Many of the shortcomings in the regulation of the law of the sea are therefore 
not directly attributable to UNCLOS.
Q1. What have been the main successes and accomplishments of UNCLOS?
3. Traditionally, activities at sea have been regulated on a zonal basis. The first attempt 
to codify the law of the sea, the four Geneva Conventions of 1958, was unsuccessful in 
dealing with maritime zones. That led to States claiming territorial seas of anywhere 
between three and 200 nautical miles (nm) in breadth and zones beyond the territorial 
sea for various purposes and of varying breadths. It further led to fears that 
technologically advanced States would arrogate large areas of the seabed to 
themselves. Not surprisingly, there were numerous disputes, such as the UK’s ‘cod 
wars’ with Iceland (1958-1976). UNCLOS put an end to such claims and the chaotic 
situation that resulted. It established:
 a maximum limit for the territorial sea of 12 nm; 
 a 24-nm contiguous zone within which coastal States may enforce their customs, 
fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws; 
 a 200-nm exclusive economic zone (EEZ) within which coastal States have 
various resource-related rights and other States enjoy the freedoms of 
navigation, overflight and the laying of cables and pipelines; and 
 established a definite, if complex, formula for determining the outer limit to the 
continental shelf, with a body of independent experts, the Commission on the 
Limits of the Continental Shelf, to ensure that States comply with that formula. 
4. Although there has been a minor amount of non-compliance with some of the 
established rules, the UNCLOS has essentially stood firm for the past 40 years and 
shows every sign of continuing to do so. UNCLOS has thus provided a stable framework 
for regulating activities at sea, something that had never previously existed. This is 
probably the greatest achievement of UNCLOS. 
5. A second achievement has been to provide a regime for regulating the mining of 
minerals from the seabed beyond the continental shelf, in the so-called International 
Seabed Area (the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction). Prior to the adoption of UNCLOS, there was a fear that deep sea 
mining would become a free-for-all. Even subsequently, there was a period of time, in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it looked as though many industrialised countries 
would not ratify UNCLOS and instead set up their own mining regime. That danger was 
averted with the conclusion of an agreement in 1994 which, while euphemistically 
described as merely ‘implementing’ Part XI of UNCLOS, in fact radically amends it. The 
agreement encouraged industrialised countries to ratify UNCLOS. Since then, the 
International Seabed Authority, which is charged with regulating deep sea mining in 
the Area, has adopted three sets of regulations governing exploration for manganese 
nodules, polymetallic sulphides and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts. The Authority is 
currently drafting regulations for commercial mining, with a deadline of June 2023. A 
major issue is how far those regulations will be able to mitigate the inevitable harm to 
the marine environment caused by deep sea mining.
6. A third achievement of UNCLOS is that it has attracted near-universal participation. Of 
the UN’s 193 members, 164 are parties to UNCLOS, along with four non-members 
(Cook Islands, European Union, Niue and Palestine). That contrasts with the 1958 
Geneva Conventions, which were ratified by less than half of then existing States. Even 
for non-parties, which include Iran, Israel, Libya, Turkey and the USA, many of the 
provisions of UNCLOS are binding because they represent customary international law.
7. Fourth, as a framework convention UNCLOS has acted as a catalyst for the adoption of 
large number of other treaties relating to the sea (see further para. 16 below). Many of 
those treaties are predicated on the jurisdictional and zonal scheme laid down by 
UNCLOS.
8. Fifth, UNCLOS contains a system of dispute settlement under which any State party to 
a dispute concerning the interpretation and application of UNCLOS may (subject to 
some exceptions) refer that dispute to adjudication without the consent of the other 
party, such consent is normally being required for other courts or tribunals to have 
jurisdiction. UNCLOS‘s dispute settlement system is therefore relatively rare among 
multilateral treaties. Around a dozen subsequent treaties make use of the UNCLOS 
system. 
9. Last, as a framework convention UNCLOS is sufficiently flexible that it has been able to 
develop in various ways, even though its formal amendment procedures are too 
cumbersome to be useful. First, two so-called implementation agreements have been 
concluded. The first, on deep sea mining, has already been mentioned (para. 5). The 
second agreement was concluded in 1995 and develops in considerable detail the 
laconic provisions of UNCLOS on the conservation and management of straddling fish 
stocks (i.e. stocks that are found both in the EEZ and high seas or that migrate 
between them) and highly migratory fish species, such as tuna. Currently, an ongoing 
UN conference, scheduled to conclude in 2022, is elaborating what may turn out to be 
a third implementation agreement, on the conservation of marine biodiversity and the 
equitable sharing of marine genetic resources in areas beyond national jurisdiction. A 
second means of developing UNCLOS has been through the so-called ‘rules of 
reference’. Those are rules that require UNCLOS parties to adopt measures to give 
effect to provisions in other treaties, even if they are not parties to them. For example, 
Article 210(6) of UNCLOS requires States parties to adopt national laws to control the 
dumping of waste at sea that are ‘no less effective than the global rules and 
standards’. As  global rules have been tightened over the past 30 years, so has the 
obligation under UNCLOS. Third, the UN General Assembly has adopted a large number 
of resolutions relating to UNCLOS, some of which may be regarded as ‘subsequent 
practice in the application of a treaty’, which means they shall be taken into account 
when interpreting UNCLOS. An example concerns provisions of UNCLOS that require 
coastal States, in respect of their EEZs, to take measures when setting allowable 
catches that ‘are designed . . . to maintain or restore populations of harvested species 
at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield [MSY], as qualified by 
relevant environmental and economic factors’. In the past it has been argued that the 
‘economic factors’ qualification would allow a coastal State to set an allowable catch at 
practically any level in order to benefit its fishing industry, even if that resulted in 
fishing above the level of MSY. It is doubtful that such a reading can still be maintained 
in view of a host of General Assembly resolutions, adopted since 2000, calling for fish 
stocks to be restored or maintained at levels of MSY ‘as determined by their biological 
characteristics’, without mention of possible qualification by environmental or economic 
factors. Last, UNCLOS has been developed through interpretation by international 
courts and tribunals. Examples of such development include the provisions relating to 
maritime boundary delimitation and environmental impact assessment.   
10.In spite of its achievements, UNCLOS does have shortcomings. It reflects the time at 
which it was negotiated. Thus, it does not directly address climate change, has very 
little to say about the conservation of marine biodiversity and raises some compatibility 
issues with future issues, such as autonomous shipping. Some of its provisions are 
compromises that have resulted in provisions that are almost empty, such as those on 
the delimitation of boundaries between overlapping EEZs and continental shelves, or 
are too broad brush to be helpful, such as those concerning the conservation and 
management of shared fish stocks. Many of these shortcomings can be, and have 
been, addressed by the various means for the development of UNCLOS outlined in the 
previous paragraph or by other treaties (see para. 16 below), which shows the 
functioning of UNCLOS as a framework convention.
Q3. How is UNCLOS enforced and how successful is its enforcement? How 
successful is dispute resolution under UNCLOS?   
11.As a framework convention UNCLOS contains relatively few substantive obligations. 
Most law applying at sea is national law and does not implement UNCLOS, although it 
may implement some of the treaties referred to in para. 16: most breaches of such law 
are by non-State actors as most activities at sea are carried out by private persons. 
Thus, the question of enforcement of UNCLOS in respect of States parties arises less 
often than might be supposed.
12.Where one State (State A) considers that another State (State B) has violated its 
(State A’s) rights, and State B’s correlative duties, there are a number of means open 
to State A to try to secure State B’s compliance with its obligations. A first means is 
retortion (i.e. a legal but unfriendly act) against State B. Most instances of retortion in 
relation to UNCLOS have taken the form of protest and assertion of rights. Either 
before or after an act of retorsion, State A could seek to resolve the matter through 
negotiation. In practice, this often works. If it did not, but the alleged violation of 
UNCLOS by State B was relatively minor and appeared to be a one-off incident, there 
would be little point in State A taking the matter further. Where, however, a violation 
was more serious and/or ongoing, and could not be settled by negotiation, State A 
could take counter-measures against State B (i.e. an act that would otherwise be 
illegal) in order to induce compliance, provided that the counter-measure was 
proportionate. For example, if State B had refused passage through its territorial sea to 
ships carrying nuclear waste of State A’s nationality, State A could retaliate by denying 
State B’s ships access to its ports. In practice, counter-measures rarely seem to be 
used to induce compliance with UNCLOS, perhaps because of the fear of adverse 
effects. If State A resorted to counter-measures but failed to induce State B to comply, 
State A could use the compulsory dispute settlement machinery of UNCLOS (mentioned 
in para. 8 above) to refer State B’s non-compliance to a court or tribunal, provided that 
the matter did not fall within one of the exceptions to compulsory settlement. In 
practice, relatively little use has been made of this possibility, perhaps because of the 
cost, effort and time required to prepare and conduct international litigation. 
13.Most of the duties imposed on States by UNCLOS give rise to a co-relative right for 
other States, and thus may be enforced in the ways explained in the previous 
paragraph. However, there are some duties, relating mainly to fisheries conservation, 
safety standards for ships and environmental protection, that do not give rise to a co-
relative right. In such cases, a State will not usually have sufficient interest to try to 
enforce alleged non-compliance with such duties by another State. A rare example is 
the South China Sea case (Philippines v. China), where the Philippines successfully 
argued that China was in breach of its duty to protect rare and fragile ecosystems and 
the habitat of threatened and endangered species. There is also an exception in 
relation to the International Seabed Area, where the International Seabed Authority is 
charged with ensuring that those engaged in seabed mining comply with their 
environmental obligations.   
14.Turning to the second half of Q3, inter-State litigation is relatively infrequent (except in 
the World Trade Organisation – WTO), and use of the dispute settlement procedures of 
UNCLOS is no exception. In the quarter of a century or so that those procedures have 
been available – and leaving aside the specialised procedure whereby a flag State of an 
arrested fishing vessel may apply to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(ITLOS) for its release on payment of a bond (which has been used nine times) – only 
24 cases have to date been referred to adjudication, nine to the ITLOS and 15 to 
arbitration. Of these, seven did not result in a judgment on the merits, either because 
the tribunal concerned lacked jurisdiction or the case was settled out of court. In 
addition, four cases are still ongoing. Of the 13 cases where there has been a judgment 
on the merits, six concerned the wrongful arrest and/or detention of a ship and five 
maritime boundary delimitation. The other two cases were the Chagos Marine 
Protected Area case (Mauritius v. UK) and South China Sea case, mentioned above. 
Compliance with a judgment seems only to have been a problem in two cases. In the 
Arctic Sunrise case, Russia rejected an award finding Russia’s arrest and detention of a 
Dutch-flagged Greenpeace ship unlawful. However, two years later (in 2019) it settled 
the case with the Netherlands and paid an undisclosed amount in compensation. The 
other case is the South China Sea case where China refused to participate in the 
arbitration, rejected the award, and published a lengthy rebuttal of the tribunal’s 
findings. Non-compliance is, nonetheless, rare.     
15.Apart from adjudication, the ITLOS has given two advisory opinions. There has also 
been one instance of ‘compulsory’ conciliation, which successfully resolved a lengthy, 
festering dispute between Australia and Timor Leste over their maritime boundary. It 
should also be noted that since UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, the International 
Court of Justice has delimited maritime boundaries in eight cases (and there are a 
further three boundary cases pending), but its jurisdiction in those cases did not derive 
from UNCLOS. It is noteworthy that all these cases disputed were settled peacefully.  
Q4. What are the other important international agreements and treaties that 
complement UNCLOS?
Q5. What is the role of the IMO and other international organisations in 
developing UNCLOS and the law of the sea?
16.As noted initially, UNCLOS is a framework convention, with numerous subsequent 
agreements on more detailed issues. The following provides an overview below of the 
main treaties in terms of subject matter.
Shipping. The IMO has developed a comprehensive set of treaties relating to the 
safety and seaworthiness of ships and for preventing pollution from shipping. These 
treaties are binding on more than 95% of the world merchant fleet by weight; may be 
easily amended to take account of developments in technology and in response to 
shipping accidents; and are effectively enforced by port States through a system of 
port State control, co-ordinated on a regional basis through regional agreements, and 
by the IMO’s mandatory flag State audit scheme. The treaties have led to a reduction 
in sub-standard ships, and consequently in shipping accidents, environmental disasters 
and casualties. The working conditions of seafarers are regulated by treaties adopted 
by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), notably the Maritime Labour 
Convention (2006). Since it came into force in 2013, it has led to improvement in 
working conditions, not least because it has a number of mechanisms for its 
enforcement. 
Fisheries. At the global level, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) has 
adopted two treaties, the Compliance Agreement (1993), which is designed to improve 
compliance with fisheries management measures adopted for the high seas, and the 
Port State Measures Agreement (2009), which is designed to deny vessels that have 
fished illegally access to markets for their catches. The FAO has also adopted various 
‘soft law’ measures, notably the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995) and 
four international plans of action, on illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, 
fishing vessel capacity, the incidental catching of seabirds, and sharks. Although these 
instruments are not legally binding, there is an expectation that States will comply with 
them and they are required to report on their implementation of them to the FAO at 
regular intervals. In addition, the WTO is currently trying to produce a treaty to phase 
out fisheries subsidies, which have undoubtedly contributed to the overfishing of many 
stocks. At the regional level, there is a network of treaties establishing some 20 
regional fisheries management organisations/arrangements for the management of 
high seas fish stocks. These bodies have to date had a somewhat chequered history. 
They have not always been able to set catches at the levels advised by scientists; 
where catch limits have been agreed, they have not always been complied with; and in 
some cases conservation efforts have been undermined by the action of non-members 
of the body concerned. Consequently, there has been overfishing of high seas fish 
stocks, as indeed there has been within EEZs.        
Pollution. There are global treaties to control pollution from shipping and the dumping 
of wastes at sea, which have resulted in reductions in pollution from ships (particularly 
of oil) and the dumping of the most noxious wastes. But there are no global rules 
addressing pollution from land-based sources (around 80% of all marine pollution, such 
as plastic pollution) and offshore petroleum activities. Instead, they are regulated by a 
dozen or so regional treaties, many concluded under the  UN Environment 
Programme’s Regional Seas Programme, but these treaties do not cover all the regions 
of the world.   
Conservation of marine biodiversity. There are many treaties aimed at conserving 
various aspects of marine biodiversity. At the global level they include the Convention 
on Migratory Species, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species, 
the Whaling Convention, UNESCO’s World Heritage Convention and the Ramsar 
Convention on Wetlands, and there may in time be an agreement on the conservation 
of biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, as explained above. At the regional 
level, there are a number of supplementary agreements under the Migratory Species 
Convention, covering, inter alia, seals, sharks, small cetaceans and turtles, and several 
of the regional pollution treaties mentioned above also deal with the conservation of 
biodiversity. The latter have led to the establishment of many marine protected areas 
in various parts of the world.
Criminal activity on the high seas. In recent decades the high seas, have become 
the scene of considerable criminal activity. UNCLOS deals in detail only with piracy. 
However, a growing network of treaties is gradually being developed to combat other 
types of crime. To date, there are treaties dealing with maritime terrorism and drug 
and people trafficking. One notable characteristic of such treaties is that they 
supplement the traditional system of exclusive flag State jurisdiction on the high seas 
(which is codified in UNCLOS) by authorising other States to take various forms of 
enforcement action against ships suspected of engaging in the activities proscribed by 
those treaties, although the consent of the flag State is necessary before a ship is 
boarded.    
Challenges
Q6. What are the main challenges facing the effective implementation of 
UNCLOS?
17.There are many challenges to good order at sea, the sustainable use of marine 
resources and the protection of the marine environment. The most important is the 
warming and acidification of seawater and sea level rise caused by global climate 
change. Other challenges include the pollution of the sea by plastics and micro-
plastics; the adverse impact of the fishing industry on the marine environment (the 
sustained overfishing of around 30% of target stocks; killing or injuring non-target 
species, such as dolphins, seabirds and turtles; and damaging seabed habitats) and 
certain forms of criminality, such as trafficking. Most of these challenges do not derive 
from poor implementation of UNCLOS. Some may be due to poor implementation of 
certain of the other treaties referred to in the previous paragraph. Others, such as the 
effects of climate change, plastic pollution and trafficking are essentially manifestations 
of problems arising on land and therefore cannot only be tackled in a framework 
convention on the law of the sea.  
18.We will discuss two of the challenges specifically mentioned by the Committee: climate 
change and human rights. The effects of climate change on the oceans are due to 
greenhouse gas emissions. The IMO is taking measures to reduce emissions from 
ships, which are responsible for about 3% of the global total. Almost all the remainder 
comes from sources on land. International action to reduce such emissions is 
coordinated through another framework convention, viz. the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change. As for the impact of climate change on the oceans, the rise in sea 
water temperatures is causing changes to the distribution of fish stocks. That may 
require changes to regimes that manage stocks co-operatively, such as regional 
fisheries management organisations/arrangements and bilateral/regional arrangements 
for shared stocks. An example is north-east Atlantic mackerel. Until a few years ago 
the stock was managed co-operatively by the EU, the Faroe Islands and Norway. 
Climate-induced changes have affected the distribution of the mackerel so that it is 
now also found in the EEZ of Iceland and on the high seas. Thus, the former trilateral 
arrangement has become outdated, but an effective arrangement to replace it has not 
yet been agreed. Such developments do not require any changes to UNCLOS because 
its provisions on shared and straddling fish stocks are so broad-brush as not to be 
affected. That is not necessarily the case with sea level rise, which in many parts of the 
world will impact on the baselines from which maritime zones are delineated by 
causing the low-water line to recede, low-tide elevations to become wholly submerged 
and islands to become low-tide elevations or disappear, including some low laying 
island States. Such developments could require some adjustment to the UNCLOS rules, 
but opinion is divided on this matter. If change is required, that need not necessarily 
come through amendment of UNCLOS or the conclusion of a further implementing 
agreement. It could result from the practice of States (see para. 9 above), as is 
already happening to some extent in the Pacific Ocean, or the work of the International 
Law Commission, which has recently put ‘Sea-level rise in relation to international law’ 
on its agenda.
19.Turning to human rights. There have been several notable rulings applying global and 
regional human treaties to incidents at sea. In addition, since 2013 the human rights of 
seafarers have been protected under the ILO’s Maritime Labour Convention (see para. 
18 above), which has its own enforcement mechanisms. In the light of these 
developments, there is no need to add provisions on human rights to directly to 
UNCLOS.
20.Some of what may be genuinely regarded as problems with the implementation of 
UNCLOS come down to the (often deliberate) ambiguity or vagueness of some of its 
provisions. For example, the disputes that have arisen from time to time between 
China and the USA over the actions of US warships and military aircraft in China’s EEZ 
are due to a lack of clarity in UNCLOS. Warships and military aircraft have a right of 
navigation and overflight through and over the EEZ, as well as to engage in ‘other 
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to’ navigation and overflight. There are 
legitimate differences of opinion between some developed and some developing States 
on the interpretation of this provision, which was left deliberately ambiguous during the 
negotiations of UNCLOS. If an attempt was made to clarify the law by amending 
UNCLOS, it is doubtful that agreement on a revised text could be reached today. As 
long as incidents are relatively infrequent and do not escalate into something more 
serious (as has been the case up to now), it is probably best to live with an unclear 
text.
21.Other problems with the implementation of UNCLOS may be due to a lack of resources 
or bureaucratic inertia. Some States have failed to manage their maritime zones 
effectively due to a lack of resources rather than the absence of the will to do so. For 
example, many West African States have not succeeded in preventing extensive illegal 
fishing in their EEZs by foreign vessels because they lack adequate means of 
enforcement. The answer to that problem lies not so much with trying to enforce 
UNCLOS as for rich countries to help those States establishing the necessary 
enforcement capacity. Bureaucratic inertia may also explain why a considerable 
number of States have failed to provide the UN with the information on the delineation 
and delimitation of their maritime zones that is required by UNCLOS.    
Q7. In the light of these challenges, is UNCLOS still fit for purpose? Can it or 
should it be renegotiated to better reflect these challenges?  
22.In our view the primary purpose of UNCLOS is to provide a framework to allow 
activities at seas to be regulated in an orderly and sustainable way, not to provide 
every last detail as to how that should be done. That is a task for other instruments, as 
mentioned above. In our view, UNCLOS does provide an appropriate framework and is 
therefore broadly fit for purpose. To the extent that it is not, its defects can be 
addressed through the mechanisms for its development that were outlined in para. 8 
above and the amendment or conclusion of other treaties, rather than through its 
renegotiation. Indeed, we believe that it would be a serious mistake to try to 
renegotiate UNCLOS. The negotiations that led to UNCLOS were lengthy (1967-1982), 
tortuous and challenging. There is no evidence that a renegotiation of UNCLOS would 
be any easier today. Indeed, it is likely to be more difficult. China has become more 
powerful and assertive, and the USA and Russia no longer share an identity of interest 
on many issues that the USA and then Soviet Union had during the negotiation of 
UNCLOS.  Even if a majority of States parties agreed to a renegotiation (which is 
doubtful), there is no certainty that agreement would be reached on a renegotiated 
text; and, even if was, that it would attract enough ratifications for its timely entry into 
force. In the meantime, the certainty and legitimacy of the existing text would be 
severely undermined.  
Summary
The main achievements of UNCLOS have been to: (1) establish a stable framework for 
regulating activities at sea through rules delineating and defining various maritime zones, 
something that had never previously existed in the law of the sea; (2) provide a regime for 
regulating the mining of minerals from the seabed beyond national jurisdiction; (3) attract 
near-universal participation; (4) act as a catalyst for the adoption of large number of other 
treaties relating to the sea, particularly as regards shipping, fisheries, protection of the 
marine environment and criminal activity on the high seas; (5) contain a system for the 
compulsory settlement of disputes relating to UNCLOS, which is being regularly used; and (6) 
be sufficiently flexible to allow UNCLOS to develop without resort to its cumbersome formal 
amendment procedures.
Challenges to the law of the sea, such as climate change and human rights, are being 
addressed in other fora. There is no need to duplicate this work, and no reason to suppose 
that if provisions on these matters were added to UNCLOS, they would lead to any more 
effective action. More generally, it would be a mistake to try to renegotiate UNCLOS to clarify 
current provisions that are ambiguous or unclear or to add provisions to meet new 
challenges. There is no guarantee that agreement on a revised text of UNCLOS could be 
reached, or in the unlikely event that it was, that it would attract the level of support that the 
present text enjoys. In the meantime, the certainty and legitimacy of that text would risk 
being undermined.       
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